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 The Supreme Court determined that a North Carolina statute of repose barred plaintiffs 
from bringing suit against CTS Corporation for contamination that occurred on land CTS owned 
24 years earlier.  The Court found that CERCLA preempts state statutes of limitations in order to 
allow plaintiffs’ claims to accrue when the injury is caused by contamination that has a long 
latency period.  However, the Court also decided that CERLCA does not preempt state statutes 
of repose because Congress did not specifically preempt them as they did with statutes of 
limitations, thus; enforcing statutes of repose was not found to frustrate the purpose of CERCLA. 
Although plaintiffs did not discover the contamination until 22 years after it occurred, they 
nonetheless failed to bring their claim within the 10 years required by the North Carolina statute 
and were barred from bringing suit.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The respondent landowners brought suit alleging damage from contaminants on their 
land which was previously owned by CTS Corporation (“CTS”).1  CTS sold portions of the 
property to landowners 24 years earlier with a promise that the site was “environmentally 
sound.”2  The Court looked to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and found that § 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose.3  
The decision reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld North Carolina’s statute 
                                                          
1
 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014). 
2
 Id.  
3
 Id. at 2180. 
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preventing a tort suit from being brought more than 10 years after the act of the defendant, thus 
barring the landowners’ claim.4 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to “promote ‘the timely cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites,’” with the costs falling on those responsible for the contamination.5  At the time of 
enactment, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works conducted a report entitled, 
Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Waste – Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies 
(“Report”), to determine the “adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies” 
including any “barriers to recovery posed by existing statutes of limitation.”6  The Report 
recommended that, due to the long latency periods of harms from toxic substances, all states 
should adopt the rule that under statutes of limitation or statutes of repose, an action does not 
accrue until “the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its 
cause.”7  Rather than wait for states to respond, in 1986 Congress added § 9658 which explicitly 
pre-empts state statutes of limitations in claims under CERCLA, but is silent on the question of 
whether statutes of repose are also pre-empted.8   
 The land in this dispute was used by CTS from 1959-1985 for manufacturing and 
disposal of electronic parts, including storage of the chemicals trichloroethylene and 
dicloroethane.9  CTS sold the property in 1987 and that buyer sold portions to the individual 
                                                          
4
 Id. at 2181. 
5
 Id. at 2180. (citing Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009)). 
6
 Id.  
7
 CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2181. (See Sen. Comm. on Env. & Pub. Works, 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages From 
Hazardous Wastes—Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies 97-571 (Sen. Comm. Print 1982)).  
8
 Id. at 2180-81. 
9
 Id. at 2181. 
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landowners now bringing suit.10  The landowners learned from the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 2009 that their well water was contaminated, allegedly stemming from CTS’ 
ownership of the land.11  Thus, in 2011 they sued CTS alleging damage from contaminants on 
the land and seeking remediation and compensation for current and future losses.12   
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed the claim on the 
grounds that North Carolina’s statute of repose prevents suits against a defendant more than 10 
years after the defendant’s last culpable act.13  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
ruling that § 9658 pre-empted the statute of repose, as was consistent with CERCLA’s “remedial 
purpose.”14  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuit courts.15 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose have distinct purposes, yet the phrases are 
often used interchangeably.  A statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues in order to encourage plaintiffs to pursue “diligent prosecution of known claims.”16  In 
comparison, statutes of repose bar suits from being brought after “a legislatively determined 
period of time” in order to provide defendants with “a fresh start or freedom from liability.”17  
Additionally, statutes of limitation provide for equitable tolling which pauses the running of the 
statute of limitations if the litigant has “pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary 
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 CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2181 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (Lexis 2013)). 
14
 Id. at 2181-82. 
15




 Id. at 2183. 
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circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”18  Conversely, statutes of repose are 
not tolled for any reason.19 
 CERCLA § 9658(a)(1) articulates that if the applicable state limitations period is earlier 
than federally required, the federally required commencement date is to be adhered to in personal 
injury and property damages cases.  Further, § 9658(b)(2) defines “applicable limitations period” 
as “the period specified in a statute of limitations” but makes no mention of whether statutes of 
repose are included under the umbrella of statutes of limitations in § 9658 and thereby pre-
empted. 
 In the Report Congress commissioned, the Committee recommended repealing both state 
statutes of repose and state statutes of limitations in the context of injuries caused by hazardous 
waste because both can potentially “[bar] a plaintiff’s claim before he knows he has one.” 20  
However, when Congress crafted § 9658, there was no mention of statutes of repose.21  The 
Court reasoned that the language describing the “applicable limitations period” is in the singular 
and would thus be awkward if it were meant to include two different time periods.22  
Additionally, § 9658(b)(2) mentions the “applicable limitations period” as the time during which 
a civil action under state law “may be brought.”23  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
points out that a statute of repose determines when a cause of action may no longer be brought, 
not when a cause of action accrues.24   
                                                          
18
 Id. (citing Lazona v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 1231-1232 (2014)). 
19
 CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2183 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 
(1991)). 
20
 Id. at 2181-82. 
21
 Id. at 2186-87. 
22
 Id.  
23
 Id.at 2187. 
24
 Id. 
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 The Court used the distinct nature of statutes of repose, the definition of “applicable 
limitations period,” and the discussion about when a suit accrues in § 9658 to support its decision 
that statutes of repose are not intended to be encompassed in § 9658.25  The Court concluded that 
Congress intended CERCLA to work comprehensively with state law. Here, where Congress did 
not alter state law, the landowners did not show that the North Carolina statute of repose impedes 
the work of CERCLA.26 
 A.  Dissent 
 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, found that the majority needed to look farther in 
the CERCLA amendment to § 9658(b)(4)(A) to find that “commencement date”  means “the date 
the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that [her] injury . . . [was] caused . . . by 
the hazardous substance.”27  She argues that this definition is supposed to apply “in lieu of” a 
state statute commencing a cause of action when the state limitation is less than what is federally 
required under § 9658(a)(1).28  The dissent goes on to discuss the issue posed by North 
Carolina’s 10 year statute of repose because many of the injuries from CERCLA sites will have a 
latency period of decades and the Statute gives contaminators an incentive to conceal.29 
V.  Conclusion 
 The Court found that in a state action brought for injury or damages due to exposure to 
hazardous substances, CERCLA § 9658 does not preempt state statues of repose for a federally 
required commencement date.  North Carolina has a statute of repose of 10 years and thus, when 
                                                          
25
 CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2187.  
26
 Id. at 2188. 
27
 Id. at 2196. 
28
 Id.   
29
 Id. at 2191. 
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landowners brought their suit more than 20 years after CTS sold the contaminated property, their 
suit was properly dismissed for timeliness. 
